Howard W. French (http://www.howardwfrench.com)

• home
• diary
• writings
• sounds
• snippets
• reading table
• photos

A Continent for the Taking

Africa first captivated New York Times journalist Howard W. French more than twenty-five years ago, but his knowledge of and passion for the continent has the depth of a lifetime association. His experiences there awakened him as nothing before to… read more

Buy from Amazon

Commentary & Reviews · Interviews

Wednesday, March 30, 2005

STAFF REPORTER

A central government campaign to strengthen the nation’s moral fibre will reach university campuses in September with the introduction of compulsory classes on ideology and morals.

The new curriculum takes effect under guidelines recently issued by the Publicity Department and the Ministry of Education, and comes after a State Council circular on ideological and moral education last year.

Xinhua reported the guidelines stipulated that students must take four compulsory courses: basic Marxist theory; Maoism, Deng Xiaoping Theory and ex-president Jiang Zemin’s Theory of Three Represents; modern Chinese history; and moral and basic legal studies.

Teachers trained by publicity and education departments will introduce the amended curriculum to first-year students on a trial basis from September before it is formally rolled out nationwide a year later.

Beijing introduced moral and ideology classes at schools in 1985 and the curriculum was revised in 1998 with greater emphasis on Marxism and Deng Xiaoping Theory. Courses on Mr Jiang’s theory started in 2003.

The central government’s recent focus on university students comes after a State Council circular issued in February last year called for efforts to improve ideological education among juveniles.

Authorities have also stepped up censorship of the internet by harassing online dissidents.

Wang Sunyu, from Tsinghua University’s Education Institute, said every country was concerned about the ideological and moral education of its citizens.

“Nowadays, students have much easier access to all kinds of information and they may develop different values,” Professor Wang said.

“If there is no positive and correct direction, turbulence could emerge and that would not good for society or the reigning authority.”

However, second-year Shandong University student Zou Xie said the ideology classes were boring and widely disliked.

“Although they are compulsory courses and we must pass them to earn academic credits, the class attendance rate is very low,” Mr Zou said.

“We usually neglect them and try to cram some knowledge in before the exams.”

Professor Wang agreed the teaching was generally “inflexible and most of instructors just read out the boring notes from the textbooks.

“Instructors should make their lessons more attractive by relating them to real life,” he said.

“For example, we cannot avoid social problems, like corruption, unfairness and a disparity between the rich and poor. We should present the issues for criticism and analysis.”

Posted at 11:02 PM · Comments (0)

Trade drives political role ahead of Zimbabwe’s election.

HARARE, ZIMBABWE – The Chinese economic juggernaut and its thirst for
minerals and markets has increasingly brought it to Africa, including
here to Zimbabwe. The fertile hills of this Southern African nation are rich
with gold and the world’s second-largest platinum reserves. In Sudan,
Angola, and along the Gulf of Guinea, the Asian giant is guzzling the
continent’s vast oil supply.

But lately the Chinese are digging on a different front, one that could
complicate the Bush administration’s efforts to promote democracy here:
African politics.

Last year, China stymied US efforts to levy sanctions on Sudan, which
supplies nearly 5 percent of China’s oil and where the US says genocide
has
occurred in its Darfur region. And as Zimbabwe becomes more isolated
from
the West, China has sent crates of T-shirts for ruling-party supporters
who
will vote in Thursday’s parliamentary elections.

In addition, China or its businesses have reportedly:

• provided a radio-jamming device for a military base outside the
capital,
preventing independent stations from balancing state-controlled media
during the election campaign;

• begun to deliver 12 fighter jets and 100 trucks to Zimbabwe’s Army
amid a
Western arms embargo; and

• designed President Robert Mugabe’s new 25-bedroom mansion, complete
with
helipad. The cobalt-blue tiles for its swooping roof, which echoes
Beijing’s Forbidden City, were a Chinese gift.

China is increasingly making its presence felt on the continent - from
building roads in Kenya and Rwanda to increasing trade with Uganda and
South Africa. But critics say its involvement in politics could help
prop
up questionable regimes, like Mr. Mugabe’s increasingly autocratic
25-year
reign.

“Suffering under the effects of international isolation, Zimbabwe has
looked to new partners, including China, who won’t attach conditions,
such
as economic and political reform” to their support, says a Western
diplomat
here. Of China’s influence on this week’s elections, he adds, “I find
it
hard to believe the Chinese would push hard for free and fair elections
-
it’s not the standard they’re known for.”

Indeed, Mugabe often praises China and Asia as part of his new “Look
East”
policy. He responded to tough questions from an interviewer on
Britain’s
Sky News last year about building his $9 million new home, while
millions
of Zimbabweans live on the verge of starvation, by saying: “You say
it’s
lavish because it is attractive. It has Chinese roofing material, which
makes it very beautiful, but it was donated to us. The Chinese are our
good
friends, you see.”

China is becoming good friends to many African nations, as the US has
been.
Between 2002 and 2003, China-Africa trade jumped 50 percent, to $18.5
billion, Chinese officials say. It’s expected to grow to $30 billion by
2006. US-Africa trade was $44.5 billion last year, according to the
Commerce Department. As the world’s largest oil importer behind the US,
China has oil interests in Sudan, Chad, Nigeria, Angola, and Gabon. The
US
is also hunting for oil in Africa, with about 10 percent of imports
coming
from the continent.

Not all of China’s activities in Africa are controversial. Under the
auspices of the UN, the China-Africa Business Council opened this
month,
headquartered in China, to boost trade and development. It has
peacekeepers
in Liberia and has contributed to construction projects in Ethiopia,
Tanzania, and Zambia, though critics say it is using these projects to
garner goodwill that it can tap into during prickly issues like
Taiwan’s
independence or UN face-offs with the US.

Here in Zimbabwe, China also may be helping to support one of Africa’s
more
oppressive regimes. The radio-jamming equipment that has prevented the
independent Short Wave Radio Africa from broadcasting into the country
is
Chinese, according to the US-funded International Broadcast Bureau.

Reporters Without Borders, a group dedicated to freedom of the press,
based
in Paris, had this to say about the jamming: “Thanks to support from
China,
which exports its repressive expertise, Robert Mugabe’s government has
yet
again just proved itself to be one of the most active predators of
press
freedom.”

A Chinese diplomat here insists the equipment didn’t come from China.
And
he says the T-shirts, which reportedly arrived on Air Zimbabwe’s new
direct
flight from Beijing, were “purely a business transaction.” But he adds
that
China-Zimbabwe relations have recently “been cemented in the field of
politics and business.”

In return for its support, China has received diplomatic backing on
Taiwan’s independence, as it has from many African nations.

Ultimately, China’s expansion into Zimbabwe and Africa is more narrow
than
the 1800s colonization by European powers, when “Christianity,
civilization, and commerce” were the buzzwords. For China, it’s all
about
economics. “They’ve said: ‘If you agree to privatize and sell to us
your
railways, your electricity generation, etc. - we will come in with
capital,” says John Robertson, an economist based in Harare.

With an economy that has shrunk as much as 40 percent in five years,
Zimbabwe’s government uses these promises to put off critics. “The
government says, ‘The Chinese are coming, and they’ll bring in billions
of
dollars in investment, and soon everything will be fully restored,’ ”
Mr.
Robertson says.

Posted at 1:49 PM · Comments (0)

The Shimane Prefectural Assembly’s establishment of an ordinance designating Feb. 22 as “Takeshima Day” to reiterate Japan’s territorial claim to the Takeshima islands, known as Tokdo in South Korea, and the Liancourt Rocks elsewhere, has aroused strong protests in Seoul and soured otherwise good bilateral relations.

What is the basis of each nation’s claim to the islands and the historical background of the territorial dispute?

On Jan. 18, 1952, the administration of Syngman Rhee, who had become South Korea’s first president in August 1948, declared sovereignty over the waters around South Korea and drew a line in the Sea of Japan, securing fishing rights in the area and claiming sovereignty over the Takeshima islands.

In July 1954, South Korea began stationing armed guards on the islands and later built a dock.

South Korea’s independence from Japan was recognized by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which went into effect on April 28, 1952.

The treaty stated South Korea’s territory included the islands of Jeju, Geomun and Ulleung, but the Takeshima islands were not mentioned.

The draft of the treaty had included Takeshima in territory to be taken from Japan, but it was deleted following protests by Japan that the island was historically an integral part of the country.

The government claims the deletion was tantamount to international recognition of Japan’s sovereignty over the islands.

South Korea, for its part, claims the island is part of its territory, citing Directive SCAPIN-677 on Japan’s temporary territory, issued by the GHQ of the occupying U.S. Army in 1946, which said that the Ulleung, Jeju and Takeshima islands were not included in Japan’s territory.

In 1954, Japan suggested arbitration before the International Court of Justice, but South Korea refused.

===

Claim based on 1905 position

Japan’s claim to the islands is based on the 1905 incorporation of Takeshima into Shimane Prefecture.

At the request of hunters who wanted to take advantage of large numbers of sea lions in the waters around Takeshima at that time, the cabinet approved the incorporation and notified the prefecture after confirming that no other countries had occupied the islands.

In 1900, the Korean Empire issued an imperial edict renaming Ulleung as Ulldo county, an administrative area covering the Ulleung, Chuk and Sok islands. (Chuk island has the same Chinese characters as Takeshima.)

However, Japan argues that the Chuk island mentioned in the imperial edict is not the Takeshima islands currently under dispute, which at that time was known by another name.

South Korea admits this, but claims that the Sok island mentioned in the edict is the current Takeshima.

However, its assertion is grounded on weak evidence.

Japan’s incorporation of the islands have led to a misunderstanding among South Koreans, that during the Russo-Japanese War, Japan stole the island by taking advantage of the confusion during the final days of the Korean Empire.

According to a South Korean-government designated history textbook for middle schools, Japan incorporated the island into its territory by force during the Russo-Japanese War, but there is no evidence Japan used force and there were no protests from South Korea at the time.

Imperial Korean records claim that Chi Jung Wang of the sixth century Silla Kingdom determined the islands were South Korean territory. Such documents and history books have imbued South Koreans with a sense of ownership of the islands.

According to the “Samguk-Sagi” (History of the Three Kingdoms), published in 1145, in 512 the Silla Kingdom conquered Ulleung, then called the State of Usan. But the book does not mention whether Takeshima was included in Usan, and the islands, which have no fresh water, show no traces of people having lived there.

Edo era sees row erupt

A fishing row in the 17th century prompted the two countries to lay claim to the islands.

Beginning in the 15th century, the Chosun dynasty repatriated islanders who had apparently gone there from the neighboring Ulleung island without permission. The islanders were returned to the mainland, leaving the islands uninhabited.

In 1618, the Tokugawa shogunate gave permission to two families from Hoki Province (present-day Tottori Prefecture) to visit Ulleung, using Takeshima as a stopover.

A protest from the Chosun Dynasty led to the shogunate’s acknowledgement that the islands belonged to Korea.

In 1696, the shogunate prohibited Japanese from sailing to Ulleung, but allowed them to go to Takeshima, which was handled as a fishing base until the Meiji era (1868-1912).

Japan’s documents confirm that An Yong Bok came to Japan twice as a Korean delegate after fishing conflicts between Japanese and Korean fishermen.

According to Chosun Dynasty documents, An said the lord of Hoki Province recognized the Ulleung and Takeshima islands as Chosun territory, but the document was stolen by members of Tsushima Province.

However, there are no documents to substantiate An’s testimony.

The Japanese government has repeatedly notified South Korea that An’s testimony was baseless after comparing his report with Japan’s documents.

Posted at 1:46 PM · Comments (0)

Copyright The New York Times
Published: March 22, 2005

Once upon a time (not long ago), what people called primitive art was rarely seen in major museums. Now we see a fair amount, and it has acquired the standard museum perks: handsome exhibitions, critical raves, academic studies and eager audiences.

It is called non-Western art. And this is not a squeamish politically correct term. It is a bland, functional one, just like “Western art.” Both kinds can be organized according to continent, country, ethnic group, period or style. The word “primitive” trumped all such categories. It didn’t mean ancient or civilized. It meant primal, instinctual and ahistorical.

Primitive was also the term applied to Western folk art. Oh, those whimsical country people painting their religious visions; those working-class eccentrics rooting through garbage for art materials; those prisoners and schizophrenics scribbling on cell walls and paper scraps.

These are cultural brand names, and they often determine what will be written in or out of art history. Think of the heavy lifting the word “post” has done for several decades now. Even a simple “new,” judiciously placed before a term like “portraiture” can make it as chic as any color just christened “the new black” by Vogue.

But the art formerly known as primitive has undergone a change. Now its practitioners are called folk, self-taught or outsider artists. “The irony is that the art hasn’t gotten better, we have,” said Brooke Davis Anderson, curator and director of the Contemporary Center at the American Folk Art Museum in New York. “At last we can recognize its quality.” That is why she dislikes the term outsider art. “Outside compared to what?” she asked. After all, it took what she called “the cultural machine” a long time to catch up with what went on inside this world.

Why? People still debate the relative value of art made to be used (crafts and design), and art made to be contemplated (painting, drawing and sculpture). It’s the utilitarian versus the high art tradition. But why must high mean better? Why can’t it just describe a certain history of techniques and practices?

Given the adulation and money poured into the high art world by collectors and corporations, the notion of art for art’s sake seems pretty passé. Maybe we’re talking about art for the sake of cultural and financial gain. Maybe the “vision thing” is a marketing strategy for a lot of artists.

Certainly, one key distinction between folk and high art has always been the status of the individual artist. The high artist has been hailed as a genius, a seer, a path breaker. The folk artist has tended to live in anonymity. This is no longer true. Artists like Henry Darger and Bill Traylor have become world-famous.

The Whitney Museum’s celebrated show “The Quilts of Gee’s Bend” (2002-3) was a turning point. Here were women from a small, isolated black community in Alabama who had been making quilts for generations. Certain formal qualities united their work. But as with any significant school, gifted individuals had found their own styles. Their experiments could be tracked; their artistic ambition was clear.

Quilts have been an honored, revitalized form for a while now. But now the high art imprimatur was firmly in place. Why? Not only were these quilts beautiful, potent and surprising, but they were also abstract, and in the world of high art, abstraction is treasured. Many people still tend to associate it with the privileges of formal education and middle-class urbanity and sophistication.

An elegant show currently on view, “Ancestry and Innovation: African American Art From the Collection,” also points up the complex union of traditions and individual talents. (It can be seen through Sept. 4.)

Here are quilts, paintings and sculptures from three generations of artists. (The oldest were born at the tail end of the 19th century. The best known, like Bessie Harvey and Thornton Dial Sr., were born in the late 1920’s. The youngest was born in the 1950’s.)

In Mary Maxtion’s “Snake Trail Quilt,” big gnarled black shapes lead - almost drive - the eye across fierce pink to borders of black and yellow. Mozell Benson’s “Strip Variation” quilt is like a tactile map. Each piece of fabric in red, green or black-and-white checks could be an imaginary country. Two sides are framed by floral print material, as though Liberty of London had found its way to Waverly, Alabama.

Sitting in the gallery center with aggressive majesty is “The Last Frontier,” Willie LeRoy Elliot’s love seat. It strides the worlds of function and sculpture like a colossus. Swirls of blue, white, red and yellow cover its wood surface. But who would choose to rest one’s weary back against the torso of a man with a snake around his neck?

The love seat doubles as a vanity (table, tray and mirror, no drawers). Why look at yourself, though, when you can look at tiles, metal, bits of glass and popsicle sticks at odd angles? “The Last Frontier” is a marvel.

Happily, institutions and individuals are deciding to throw out the old debates about the relative values of art designated fine, folk, high or utilitarian. The point is to understand each tradition. The point is to open one’s eyes to any artist who, as Joseph Conrad said, can make us hear, feel and above all see

Posted at 1:00 PM · Comments (0)

Mar 29, 2005 (050329)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor’s Note

Among the most daunting barriers to addressing Africa’s urgent
health needs is the migration of health professionals to richer
countries. Skilled personnel representing investment by poor
countries end up filling in the gaps for the UK, USA, and other
countries. The problem is widely acknowledged. But a new paper
from Medact, based on the experience of Ghana and the UK,
argues that current policy responses are not only inadequate but
also based on many false assumptions.

The paper excerpted below, the lead author of which is a Ghanaian
medical doctor working in Kumasi, Ghana, argues that attempts to
control mobility to solve this problem are both ineffective and
questionable in terms of human rights. “The employment in wealthy
countries of health professionals trained in staff-short low-income
countries contributes to rising international inequity in health
care,” the authors say. “That effect should be central to the design
of policy responses to health professional migration … The
objective of policy towards migration should be, not limitation of
mobility, but equity in health care as soon as possible.”

For additional documents from Medact and Save the Children on this
issue, including a four-page briefing on how Africa helps subsidise
health care in the United Kingdom, visit
http://www.medact.org/hpd_brain_drain.php

For excerpts from an earlier Physicians for Human Rights report on
this issue, visit http://www.africafocus.org/docs04/acc0407b.php

All previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on health topics are available
at http://www.africafocus.org/healthexp.php

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Many thanks to those of you who have recently sent in a voluntary
subscription payment to support AfricaFocus Bulletin. And a
reminder to all that this information service depends on support
from subscriber. See http://www.africafocus.org/support.php for
details.

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor’s note+++++++++++++++++++++++

The ‘Skills Drain’ of Health Professionals from the Developing
World: a Framework for Policy Formulation

Kwadwo Mensah, Maureen Mackintosh and Leroi Henry*

February 2005

* Kwadwo Mensah is a medical doctor and independent health
management consultant, Kumasi, Ghana; Maureen Mackintosh and Leroi
Henry are at The Open University, UK.

Medact http://www.medact.org

[Excerpts. For full paper, including tables and references, visit
http://www.medact.org/hpd_brain_drain.php]

Summary

This paper should be read in association with its companion paper
on migration and human rights (Bueno de Mesquita and Gordon 2005).
Human rights discussed there form part of the ethical and political
premises of this paper. This paper in turn examines policy towards
health professionals’ migration from economic and governance
perspectives. Our aims are conceptual and agenda-setting. In
essence, we argue that current policy responses to migration of
health professionals from low income developing countries
underestimate the pressures and mis-identify the reasons for rising
migration, overestimate the impact of recruitment policies on
migration flows while ignoring unintended side effects, and
mis-specify the ethical dilemmas involved.

The paper employs as its central case study the migration of health
professionals from Ghana, the home country of the lead author, to
the UK. This case is typical neither of migration flows nor impact,
and is not presented as such. Rather, Ghana-UK migration provides
a good example of many of the worst problems and contradictions in
the current situation and policy debate. We therefore employ it as
a test case, a source of insight, and a ‘place to stand’ in
constructing arguments that can be tested subsequently on a wider
field.

The paper puts forward the following propositions, with evidence
where available and with identification of gaps in evidence that
research could usefully address.

1.The employment in wealthy countries of health professionals
trained in staff-short low income countries contributes to rising
international inequity in health care. That effect should be
central to the design of policy responses to health professional
migration: the inequity ought to be tackled systematically and in
a co-ordinated way. The objective of policy towards migration
should be, not limitation of mobility, but equity in health care as
soon as possible.

2.The migration of health service professionals is an aspect of
rapid international integration and commercialisation of health
service labour markets, in the context of high levels of
international inequality. These processes are cumulative,
self-reinforcing, and hard to reverse; policy must work with, not
against their grain.

3. Coercive measures to prevent departure, taken in low income
countries that are losing staff, work poorly; worse, they can
intensify pressures to leave. Conversely, incentives to stay that
redress the key violations of decent working and living conditions,
and that value skills and commitment, do work, and lessen rather
than worsen inequalities; the implication is that health service
financing and governance needs to improve in countries that are
losing staff.

4.The UK Department of Health’s ‘ethical recruitment’ Code reflects
a welcome recognition of the detrimental impact of international
recruitment on the health systems of some developing countries. It
is however generally ineffective; it may impose increased migration
costs on staff from those countries; furthermore it is implicitly
discriminatory along the lines of ‘race’, affecting as it does
mainly African and Caribbean, hence predominantly black, staff.The
Code is thus neither an ethically satisfactory nor an effective
response to the detrimental impact of staff loss on low income,
staff-short health systems; a better recruitment policy response
would improve migration experiences and strengthen likelihood of
return.

5.The benefits of migration to migrants’ home countries are
substantial, but do not compensate for the health service impacts;
furthermore the problems suffered by migrants and by divided
families can be substantial.

6.The net effect of some types of health professional migration
such as that from Ghana is a perverse subsidy: a net flow of
benefits from poor to rich country health services. That perverse
subsidy is indefensible, contributing as it does to worsening the
huge inequality in health services between the UK and developing
countries, including Ghana. UK health service users benefit from
the services of people who would otherwise be caring for African
health needs, hence compensation should be paid to remove this
perverse subsidy from poor to rich.

7. It is possible to design compensation in such a way that it
overcomes most of the main objections usually presented, of which
by far the most important is that it constitutes a tax on migration
that undermines the right to migrate.

8.This would be best done within a political framework that
accepted that health professional migration blurs the boundaries
between countries’ of origin and destination countries’ health
services. In the case of the UK and Ghana these boundaries are
already permeable. The best way forward is therefore to build on
current links between institutions, professional associations,
trades unions and individuals so that, for example, Ghanaian and UK
professionals increasingly accept that they are colleagues in a
joint enterprise of health service development that can only be
done ethically if it explicitly addresses, over time, inequalities
of services and conditions.

This returns us to our initial point. The objective of migration
policy is not limitation of mobility but equity of health care as
soon as possible.

…

Health and inequality: ethical dilemmas, and the example of Ghana

Health inequality across the world is extreme. The populations of
low income countries from which some health professionals are
migrating to the UK, the USA and other high income countries, and
especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa, suffer appallingly high
levels of morbidity and mortality, associated with very severe
underfunding of the health services (public and private) that
should respond to those problems.

Table 1 shows just one snapshot of this intolerable inequity. The
African countries shown are those in the ‘top 25’ countries of
origin of overseas nurses registering in the UK in 2003/4.The
number of new nurse registrations is shown alongside the total
doctors on the UK register from those countries, and is compared
with Asian countries from which many health professional migrants
also come. A rich Commonwealth country of origin (Australia) and
the UK are shown for comparison1. The table also shows life
expectancy and total (public and private) health expenditure. In
Eastern and Southern Africa life expectancy has been cut
dramatically by HIV/AIDS. The inequality in life expectancy one
indicator of health care need is huge, dwarfed only by the extent
of relative privilege in rich countries indicated by the comparison
of African and Asian with Australian and UK health spending.

This is the economic and social context in which global labour
markets for health professionals are increasingly integrating, as
hiring of overseas-trained professionals by rich country health
systems increases. The dependence of the UK health service on
overseas-trained staff is nothing new. As Table 1 shows, over one
third of registered doctors are not originally from the UK, and not
far off half of newly registrant nurses are from overseas. The UK
population relies for its standard of health care on health
professionals trained elsewhere, and the consequences of this
‘skills drain’ for low income, staff-short health care systems and
the populations who rely upon them, is now widely recognised by
policy makers (House of Commons 2004, Department of Health
2004,Willetts and Martineau 2004). This paper argues that policy
still has a substantial way to go - in the UK and even more
elsewhere - in responding effectively to the ethical dilemmas and
obligations this dependence creates.

The paper employs the case of Ghana, and the migration of Ghanaian
health service personnel from Ghana to the UK, as our central case
study. From it, we generate arguments about the economic and
governance policy issues surrounding health professional migration.
We do not imply by our choice of case study that migration from
Ghana is ‘typical’ statistically or culturally, nor that it forms
a very large part of the total migration flow to the UK or the USA;
neither assertion is true. Rather, the widely cited Ghanaian case
focuses on a number of the most serious stresses and contradictions
generated by the current international labour market for health
professionals.

Ghana is a low income country with an absolute and rising shortage
of health care professionals and high and rising out-migration. It
has a growing economy and a government making substantial efforts
to improve health care. However the country is spending far too
little on health to achieve decent provision for its citizens.
Ghanaian health spending was $US12 per head in 2002 (Table 1), of
which $7 was public spending. The WHO’s Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health estimated the cost of a set of ‘essential
interventions’ at US$34 per capita per year, much of which would
need to be public spending, or $45 to include some additional
hospital services (Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 2001).

As Table 2 illustrates, the gulf in indicators of need and in
health professional staffing between the two countries is huge.
Insufficient health personnel form one of the main constraints
limiting health service capacity to deliver even basic services; in
crosscountry comparisons, health service staffing is associated
with better health outcomes after allowing for the effects of
higher income on health (WHO 2003, Chen et al 2004, Anand and
Baernighausen 2003). It follows that in Ghana, as in many other low
income countries, many people are denied the health care that is an
essential component of the right to health, and the failure is
worsened by out-migration. The Ghana Health Service (GHS) is still
achieving substantial immunisation coverage (Table 1) but that is
now under threat from declining staff numbers, and health the
‘skills drain’ of health professionals from the developing world 9
indicators such as infant mortality are showing signs of worsening;
surveys show facilities are ‘grossly understaffed’ (Nyonator et al
2004).The extreme inequalities of income, working conditions and
employment rights that are associated with struggling, underfunded
health services, so well illustrated by the Ghanaian case, are the
context of policy towards professional migration by health services
staff, and should be its key concern.

The Ghanaian government and health care authorities, like others in
comparable situations, face a dilemma. Ghana has ratified
international human rights treaties which impose binding legal
obligations to ensure that their people have decent health care and
safe working conditions4.On the other hand, overworked and
underpaid doctors and nurses are looking for alternatives, often
helped by international recruiting agencies that the Ghana
government, like many African governments, accuses of poaching
their much-needed medical staff (Itano 2002, House of Commons
2004). The Ghana Health Service has close current and historical
links with the UK NHS, and there has in the recent past been active
recruitment in Ghana for the NHS.

Ghanaian health care professionals who migrate and who return, of
whom the lead author is one, also face painful dilemmas and
contradictory pressures that policy towards migration must
confront. If the health care workers in developing countries seek
to demand their rights, then going on strike, for example, removes
the health care of other people. This is a dilemma of conflict
between rights, rooted in poor conditions of the health system.
Health service administrators in Ghana seek a working compromise
after industrial action - then after a couple of years, this
conflict reemerges. Some health workers, to avoid this spiral of
conflict, decide to leave.

Finally, policy makers in high income countries also face
dilemmas. There are strong economic and political pressures at
present in the OECD countries to recruit health workers from
overseas (Forcier et al 2004, Stilwell et al 2004). Responding to
these pressures is compatible with individuals’ wishes to
migrate. Trades unions and professional associations including the
Royal College of Nursing (RCN) in the UK for example support
individual nurses’ rights to travel and work overseas to develop
their practice and further their experiences (RCN 2002).

There is now a strong and welcome awareness not only among health
policy makers and aid donors, but also in the broader policy and
activist communities in the rich countries, and among health
service trades unions, of the damage done in some developing
countries by loss of large proportions of skilled health care
staff. We discuss below the policy approach that has widespread
support at present in the UK, which is often characterised as
‘ethical recruitment’, yet, we will argue, lacks a solid ethical
base.

The current Department of Health Code of Practice for international
recruitment of health care professionals in England and Wales
(Department of Health 2004) includes Ghana as a country from which
active recruitment is unacceptable because it will undermine local
health care delivery. If the underlying intention to reduce
recruitment were to be effective, the Code would amount to
selective restriction of individuals’ right to leave their country
purely on the grounds of profession and nationality; if it is
ineffectual, as it appears to be, then the underlying problems
should be addressed in other ways. The Code causes unease precisely
because it appears implicitly discriminatory along racial lines: it
implies (given the selected countries of origin) that migrants from
richer countries should be preferred to Caribbean and African
health professional migrants, an implication that can risk playing
into a racist agenda on immigration policy.

Finally, in considering the arguments for restitution payments, in
response to the benefits health professional migrants from low
income countries bring to rich country health services, Ghana
provides a highly relevant test case, illustrating the scale of the
subsidy from poor to rich involved. Ghana would provide, because of
its very particular set of characteristics including relatively
small size, a long political association with the UK and active
participation by its governments in the recent political debates on
health professional migration, an excellent setting for
experimentation in the way in which such restitution processes
might be designed and managed.

Ghana is thus, in this paper, a test case, a source of insight, a
‘place to stand’ in constructing the arguments that can be tested
subsequently in a wider field. The purpose of this paper is to make
a series of arguments about ways of understanding the migration
process as a basis for policy, and the policy implications that
emerge from these insights. We draw from, and reference, but do not
attempt to summarise the voluminous relevant literature to which we
hope to make a useful contribution.

Posted at 11:26 AM · Comments (0)

Beijing Forges Deep Alliances
With War-Torn Nations,
Countering U.S. Influence
A Dam Gets Built on the Nile

Copyright THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
March 29, 2005; Page A1

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia — When this east African country went to war against neighboring Eritrea in the late 1990s, the U.S. responded by evacuating its Peace Corps volunteers, scaling back military aid and issuing a security warning to U.S. citizens and companies.

The Chinese government had a different reaction. Beijing saw the war — and the reduced U.S. presence — as an opportunity to expand its influence. It dispatched even more diplomats, engineers, businessmen and teachers to Ethiopia. New aid grants soon rolled in, followed by bank credits for Chinese companies operating there.

Today, China’s influence in Ethiopia is overwhelming. Its embassy is among the largest in the country and hosts more high-level visits than any Western mission. Chinese companies have become a dominant force, building highways and bridges, power stations, mobile-phone networks, schools and pharmaceutical plants. More recently, they have begun exploring for oil and building at least one Ethiopian military installation.

It’s all part of Beijing’s broad push into Africa. Aiming to secure access to the continent’s vast natural resources, China is forging deep economic, political and military ties with most of Africa’s 54 countries. There’s more at stake than just fuel for an economic juggernaut, however, say senior Chinese officials, executives and Western diplomats. In Africa, as in many other parts of the developing world, China is redrawing geopolitical alliances in ways that help propel China’s rise as a global superpower. China is courting other countries to support its plan to reassert political authority over Taiwan and seeking a counterweight against U.S. power in global bodies such as the United Nations. It’s also thinking long-term, cultivating desperately poor nations to serve as markets for its products decades down the road.

For the U.S., China’s Africa initiative poses new challenges. Despite a landmark trade pact signed with Africa in 2000, U.S. influence has leveled off in many African countries and in some cases declined. Now, as Washington focuses its attention on the Middle East, it faces a formidable player in a region key to future U.S. economic and security interests.

In oil-rich Nigeria, China is rebuilding the railroad network. In Rwanda, Chinese companies have paved more than 80% of the main roads. In more than a dozen African countries, Chinese firms are searching for oil and gas and rebuilding electricity grids and telephone networks. Chinese companies own one of Zambia’s largest copper mines and run a major timber operation in Equatorial Guinea. In tiny Lesotho, Chinese businessmen own and operate nearly half of all the supermarkets and a handful of textile companies.

Though these interests stretch from massive state-funded projects to small private ventures, they all share a common thread: Beijing’s policy of actively encouraging its companies and citizens to set up shop in Africa at a record pace.

“China has simply exploded into Africa, as in ‘Katie-bar-the-door stuff,’ ” says Walter Kansteiner, a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs. Adds Rep. Ed Royce, a California Republican and vice chairman of a House subcommittee that deals with Africa: “China’s increasing engagement in Africa is a concern and we need to focus on it before Beijing becomes fully established.”

Last year, Africa supplied more than 15% of U.S. oil imports, and the figure is forecast to rise sharply in the decade ahead. Africa is also becoming a major global supplier for metals, timber and other natural resources.

Yet in some of Africa’s most promising commodities markets, China is now challenging U.S. and other Western firms for access to these goods. Since 2000, China’s trade with Africa has nearly tripled to almost $30 billion. Last year, China spent almost $10 billion on African oil, accounting for nearly one-third of its total crude imports. That’s twice as much as it imported from Saudi Arabia, traditionally one of Beijing’s biggest suppliers. In oil-rich Angola, where ChevronTexaco Corp. and Exxon Mobil Corp. have large operations, China has become a major buyer and an increasingly active investor.

Unlike the U.S., which bars U.S. companies from doing business with some outlaw regimes, Beijing expresses no qualms about dealing with the continent’s most brutal and corrupt leaders. Instead, Chinese leaders prefer to view their relationship through a North-South prism, emphasizing the need for developing nations to band together against the industrialized West. “China is ready to coordinate its positions with African countries…with a view to safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries,” said Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during a 2003 speech in Ethiopia.

What’s more, many Chinese companies operating in Africa are government-owned and less concerned with near-term profits. Indeed, by reaching out to African leaders who are shunned by Western nations, and throwing money at projects Western companies avoid, Chinese officials and businessmen say they are able to secure more business deals and build political influence at a far more rapid pace.

Consider Sudan, a war-torn nation set across from Saudi Arabia on the coast of the Red Sea. In 1997, the U.S. passed a law barring U.S. oil companies from investing there, saying Sudanese leaders had engaged in human-rights abuses and sponsored terrorism. In the years that followed, China invested more than $2 billion in Sudan’s oil industry. Today, Sudan provides China with nearly 5% of its annual oil imports. Beijing, meantime, has become one of Sudan’s largest arms suppliers, according to foreign diplomats and aid workers in the region. China’s foreign affairs ministry declined to comment.

More recently, the U.S. sought to impose United Nations sanctions on Sudan amid continuing violence in the Darfur region, where pro-government militiamen have raped and murdered civilians while suppressing a rebel uprising. Beijing deflated these sanction efforts by threatening to use its veto power in the U.N. Security Council. Yet far from seeing itself as complicit in Sudanese violence, Beijing sees the oil project as a symbol of China’s reliability when others have left. “It’s part of our policy of long-term cooperation that helps both sides,” says Li Xiaobing, a senior Africa official at China’s Ministry of Commerce.

A similar dynamic is now playing out in Zimbabwe. Over the past three years, the U.S. and European Union imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe and dozens of his closest government officials. In power for 25 years, Mr. Mugabe presides over what is widely regarded as one of Africa’s most corrupt and ruthless regimes. Human-rights organizations and Western governments regularly cite his regime for its use of arbitrary arrests, torture and murder to suppress political dissent.

By sanctioning Zimbabwe, the U.S. and EU hoped to isolate and ultimately unseat Mr. Mugabe. China, as a matter of policy, has worked to blunt the impact, boosting aid and investment. Last year, it opened direct flights between the two countries. Chinese leaders still afford Mr. Mugabe huge respect. Since 1980, Beijing has invited the president to China seven times, feting him at banquets. Dozens of Chinese leaders, including former Communist part boss Jiang Zemin, have visited him.

The close ties are now paying dividends for such companies as China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corp., or Catic. A trading company jointly owned by two large Chinese aerospace concerns, Catic between 2003 and 2004 signed a series of contracts valued at $300 million to rebuild Zimbabwe’s electricity grid. It has a raft of other deals in the pipeline — including possible military aircraft sales, company officials say. “We see Zimbabwe as a great opportunity, a great place to make money,” says Wang Dawei, the company’s vice president.

A spokesman for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined to discuss Mr. Mugabe’s human-rights record, saying “China and Zimbabwe have a traditional friendship and a relationship based on cooperation.”

There is also a softer side to China’s pursuit of Africa, one that could help Beijing if regimes that it’s closely associated with, such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, are toppled. In 2000, Beijing voluntarily waived $1.2 billion in sovereign African debt and it recently agreed to bring some 10,000 African students to China on scholarships. Across Africa, it has dispatched hundreds of doctors and teachers in recent years.

China’s ties to Africa date back to the 1950s, when Beijing threw its support behind African independence movements as a way to counter U.S. and Soviet influence in the region. These days, Beijing’s emissaries to Africa have swapped their uniforms and weapons for business suits and name cards. In 2000, China established the pro-business China-Africa Cooperation Forum with 44 African nations, paving the way for a free-trade and investment pact with the region.

Few countries have felt China’s influence as much as Ethiopia. Though China established relations with Ethiopia in 1970, ties were limited until the mid-1990s. That’s when Beijing initiated a broader push across Africa in an effort to secure natural resources and political influence on the continent.

A decade later, Ethiopia has become a reflection of China’s wider ambitions in Africa and the changes it portends for the region. A poor, landlocked nation of 68 million people, Ethiopia lacks the vast natural resources that have drawn China’s interest in other countries. But it has something else Beijing craves: geopolitical clout in the region. Ethiopia is the source of the Blue Nile, the river that slakes Egypt’s thirst. It is the meeting ground between largely Muslim north Africa and the Christian south. And it’s the seat of the African Union, the political body that represents the continent.

Wu Ping, a tall man in his mid-40s, was one of Beijing’s pioneers in Africa. In 1993, he was dispatched to Ethiopia by Catic, the state firm rebuilding Zimbabwe’s electricity grid. His simple orders: open a trade company and develop political relationships. Mr. Wu began by selling things like milling equipment for sugar cane. Later he branched into tractors. Though he made little money, he forged close relations with Ethiopian officials, partially, he says, by paying the occasional bribe. “Sometimes it’s the only way to get things done in Africa,” he says. A Catic spokesman in Beijing says the company has a strict internal policy against paying bribes and denies it’s a widespread problem.

Today, Mr. Wu cruises around Addis Ababa in a Toyota Land Cruiser and presides over a growing business empire. His latest project: an $11 million airport hanger that, when complete later this year, will be able to house the world’s largest aircraft.

To secure the contract, Mr. Wu beat out an Australian company by deliberately underbidding the contract. Though he will lose money on the deal, he says it’s all part of Catic’s strategy. “Almost every African leader passes through this airport to attend meetings at the African Union,” he says, standing a short distance from dozens of Chinese and African workers working at the construction site. “So they will all see our hangar.”

Even more important, Mr. Wu says the owner of the hangar, Ethiopia Air, is mulling a large order of propeller aircraft, and the hangar contract has opened the door with officials who will play a role in that decision. “That’s my company’s real goal in Africa — to sell airplanes, both commercial and military,” he says.

Unlike Mr. Wu, Deng Guoping, general manager of China Road and Bridge Corp. in Ethiopia, says he’s not sure his company will ever make money here. In the past six years, Mr. Guo has paved five highways stretching more than 300 miles. Three more roads are under construction and he’s bidding on another three.

In all, Chinese contractors have stitched together a road network that reaches Ethiopia’s northern border with Sudan to the eastern seaport of Djibouti to the southern border area with Kenya. China Road secured most of its contracts through public tenders. Yet Mr. Deng says he is instructed to slice projected profit margins so thin — about 3% — that losses are inevitable, given perennial cost overruns in Africa. Western businesses, by contrast, typically pad bids with projected profits of 15% and more. Even so, Mr. Deng has his eye on a range of new projects, including water reservoirs, airport facilities and a railway project. “We’re a government company and the Chinese government wants us here building things,” he says.

The U.S. still provides Ethiopia with more assistance than any other nation, nearly $500 million last year. But for U.S. companies, Ethiopia’s small market, uncertain legal system and sometimes fast-changing political currents make the country a risky place to do business. One of the only U.S. companies with substantial business in Ethiopia is Boeing Co., which supplies Ethiopia Air with the passenger jets for its international routes.

In contrast, Chinese companies say these factors sometimes helps advance Beijing’s wider goals. The story of Jiangxi International Economic and Technical Cooperation Co., another state firm active in Ethiopia, explains how. A few years ago, a flood in Ethiopia left a few hundred people homeless. Not long after, Beijing pledged about $4 million to build them new homes. It hired Jiangxi International as contractor. At a ground breaking ceremony, China’s ambassador and Ethiopia officials shook hands and smiled for photographers.

About a year later, eight modern apartment buildings, each five floors with pink walls and blue-trim windows, were completed. But the homeless families never moved in. Instead, the complex was handed to Ethiopia’s Ministry of Defense, which used them to house its own personnel. Today, a corrugated metal fence rings the complex, with a small group of guards stationed at one corner. “We don’t really care who uses it,” says a senior executive at Jiangxi International, requesting his name not be used. “It was a political task for us and so long as Ethiopia officials are happy, our goal is fulfilled.”

A spokesman for Ethiopia’s Ministry of Defense said the flood victims didn’t like the apartments and were relocated to another neighborhood, and that the Ministry later purchased the apartment block.

Lately, Beijing has begun winning projects that have geopolitical relevance, such as Ethiopia’s Takazee Dam — a massive, $300 million hydro-power station that is rising on the headwaters of the Blue Nile River. Set deep in a mountainous region near the border with Sudan and Eritrea, the Takazee Dam has been on Ethiopia’s drawing board for over a decade. But getting it off the ground hasn’t been easy, thanks to Egypt. Cairo has long feared any project that could affect the flow of the Nile, viewing its own access to those waters as a matter of national security. Indeed, so great was its concern over Takazee that Egyptian officials have made clear that any attempt to divert Nile water could result in military action, according to senior Chinese and Egyptian officials.

That warning scared off the World Bank and other international financial organizations, and also raised concern among potential foreign contractors. Several years ago, Ethiopia announced it would finance the project on its own. Though a handful of Western contractors submitted bids, the Ethiopian government awarded the project to Chinese companies. Since then, Egypt has taken a more low-key attitude toward the dam. Chinese engineers say there are no immediate plans to divert the dam’s waters for other uses, such as irrigation.

Today, the Takazee Dam is inching toward completion. Already, hundreds of Chinese engineers have carved out a vast administrative camp, an underground tunnel nearly a mile long and deep caves that will hold massive power turbines. Later this year, they will begin pouring the 600-foot-high cement dam. Once complete, the Takazee dam will stand as one of Africa’s largest, and will help change the lives of those who live in northern Ethiopia, where electricity is often nonexistent. Ultimately, some of the power could be pooled into a regional power grid.

That would allow neighboring countries to tap into the power. And it would also further China’s ambition of expanding oil and mineral exploration in the region, particularly in southern Sudan. Says Girma Biru, Ethiopia’s Minister of Trade: “China has become our most reliable partner and there is a lot we can learn from Beijing, not just in economics but politics as well.”

Posted at 10:13 PM · Comments (0)

By HOWARD W. FRENCH

Copyright The New York Times - Published: March 28, 2005

DANDONG, China - At night, the view from the upper floor of a hotel looking out across the Yalu River toward the North Korean city of Sinuiju seems one of utter desolation. Three naked bulbs twinkling feebly is all that can be seen along a several-miles arc of riverfront.

By day, though, the scene at the border in this bustling Chinese city could scarcely be more different. Trucks steadily lumber across the bridge linking the countries, ferrying North Korean raw materials into China and Chinese manufactured goods to market in North Korea.

Westerners have long taken the nighttime view as the truest reflection of North Korea, a country all but frozen in time, its leaders so obsessed with control that they do not countenance contact with the outside world. The view from China, though, in cities like this, where small groups of North Koreans can be found in the downtown shops and hotels, scouring the city for bargains, is of a country already well into an experiment, however uncertain, aimed at rebuilding its economy and even opening up, ever so gingerly, to the outside world.

North Koreans who have recently arrived in China, and Chinese businessmen who have extensive experience in North Korea, speak of significant changes in the economic life in a country with a reputation as one of the most closed and regimented.

They say the changes, which were officially started in 2002 and have gradually gained momentum, have undone many of the most basic tenets of North Korea’s Communist system, where private commerce was banned, private property circumscribed, and an all-powerful state the universal employer and provider.

Now in ways that many Chinese say remind them of their own early economic reforms a quarter century ago, North Korean farmers are allowed to take over fallow land and plant it for their own profit, selling their products in markets.

“It seems they are learning from the Chinese model of the 1980’s, giving land to farmers and not allowing people to depend on the central government for everything,” said Yu Zhongde, a Chinese businessman whose company operates bus routes in North Korea. “The rate of change is speeding up, and the aspiration for wealth among the people is really growing.”

In the cities, Mr. Yu and others say, the changes have been even more noticeable, with people being allowed to trade goods for profit in newly created public markets, including 38 in the capital, Pyongyang. These days, traders sell everything from clothing and bicycles to televisions and refrigerators, mostly imported from China.

Private automobile ownership is still not permitted, but people reported seeing signs advertising used cars for sale in Pyongyang, nonetheless. Here and there, others also report the opening of small restaurants and karaoke bars.

“The standard of living is improving, not just in Pyongyang, but throughout the country,” said another Chinese businessman who has been a frequent visitor to the country since 1997. “Nowadays, if you have money you can buy whatever you want. The problem is that most people still don’t have much money.”

Similar comments about the recent availability of goods were repeated in numerous interviews with North Koreans who had illegally slipped across the porous border, taking a risk in hopes of earning some money in China and buying goods to carry back and sell.

The difference in the remarks of Chinese business people and the North Koreans is one of tone, with the North Koreans almost universally asserting that life has gotten tougher, not better, since the introduction of the economic changes.

“The government has no money, and everything has become much more expensive,” said a woman from the northeastern city of Chongjin, who sneaked into China three months ago. “Many people steal things to survive.”

People from the countryside said farmers had tended to do better than city residents under the economic changes. “You can find anything you want in the markets now, but the prices are too high for us to afford them,” said one 50-year-old woman from a village in the Musan region, near the Chinese border. “Farming for ourselves, though, made us better off than people in the towns. At least we always had enough to eat.”

Deok Ryong Yoon, an economist at the South Korean Institute for International Economic Policy, acknowledged the growing social disparity. “The market has become the main mechanism for the North Korean economy, and they are trying to use the market to rehabilitate their economy,” he said. “The changes have increased net production in North Korea. They have more goods and seem to be benefiting from the reforms, but distribution is very unequal.”

North Korean officials have used the state’s propaganda machine to spread the new market-economy gospel, including quotes from the supreme leader, Kim Jong Il. They began with an article attributed to Mr. Kim published in the state press in 2001 under the headline “Gigantic Change,” in which he called for making “constant efforts to renew the landscape to replace the one which was formed in the past, to meet the requirements of a new era.”

More recent articles have gone further, praising some aspects of capitalism and extolling “those with money using money” as a new force for social regeneration. Many analysts say this most recent language also echoes important changes in China, including most famously the quote often attributed to Deng Xiaoping: “to be rich is glorious.”

Chinese businessmen and foreign economists say North Korea’s emergent capitalist class has two disparate components: the operators of a small, clandestine private economy who have survived since their emergence during the famines of the mid-1990’s, when the state distribution system was failing, and a far larger group consisting of officials of all description, from petty and mid-level functionaries to members of the political elite and perhaps largest of all, the military.

“Pretty much everyone in business is an official of one kind or another,” said one Chinese investor who is a frequent visitor to North Korea. “Ordinary people simply don’t have the money, and if they had money, they’d be asked where they got it, and get in trouble.”

The businessman said corruption, abuse of office and the seemingly arbitrary application of rules were the biggest weaknesses in the country’s new policy drive. “Changes are declared,” he said. “They are spoken, but it’s not put into law, and this makes it very difficult for business.”

Ordinary citizens say these uncertainties hit them hard, too. A hint of this notion, of a state that gives and can also take away, was included in a sarcastic but menacing commentary by North Korea after its rejection last month of new multinational talks about its nuclear program. Washington “can just have talks with peasant market merchants, whom the United States is said to like, or with the representatives of the North Korean defectors organizations the United States is said to have formed.”

One city dweller told a story of how the government had engineered the introduction of new banknotes for the won, the currency, as part of the economic changes. With little explanation except a vague discussion of addressing social inequality, people were ordered to turn in their old won for new ones, the woman said.

“No matter how much of the old money you turned in, each family was given 4,500 new won,” she said. “You didn’t dare complain. If you did, you would be denounced as an enemy of the people.”

Posted at 9:07 AM · Comments (0)

Copyright THE AUSTRALIAN
28 March 2005

The Chinese Government issued a sharp warning yesterday that a march by
hundreds of thousands of people in Taipei to protest at China’s new
anti-secession law on Taiwan had created “new tension across the Taiwan
Strait”.

China vowed, again, never to back down over Taiwan. In an official
commentary carried in all major newspapers and broadcast on state
television, it accused the “extreme Taiwan independence secessionists”
of
“malevolently distorting the principles of the law to misguide the
Taiwan
people and instigate antagonism and create new tension across the
Taiwan
Strait”.

But the big problem for Beijing is that most of the rest of the world
thinks
it is Beijing, not Taiwan, that has increased the risk of hostilities
over
the island, by introducing the new law authorising the use of force
against
Taiwan just when relations looked ripe for repair.

The law, which gives China legal backing to use “non-peaceful means” if
Taiwan moves to formally split from the mainland, has unravelled a
European
Union consensus to lift a 16-year-old ban on trading arms with China, a
move
which had been expected by mid-year but may now be delayed.

By underlining China’s willingness to go to war over Taiwan, the law
has
also set back China’s multi-faceted diplomatic campaign to persuade the
world, and the East Asian region especially, that its rise as a world
power
is peaceful and does not constitute a threat to other nations.

Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian joined hundreds of thousands of
protesters who converged on central Taipei on Saturday, marching from
10
different rallying points to represent the 10 clauses of the
anti-secession
law passed by the Chinese legislature on March 14.

Rally organisers invited participants to bring their children and pets
for
what they described as a “democratic carnival”. Children were reported
to
have bared their bottoms to reveal anti-missile messages, a reference
to the
several hundred missiles China has poised in Taiwan’s direction.

Although Mr Chen kept to his promise not to address the rally for fear
of
enraging Beijing unnecessarily, he did mount a stage and led the crowd
in
chanting slogans, including “What do we want from China? Peace!”
But in state-controlled Chinese media, special criticism was reserved
for Mr
Chen. “We noticed some political figures of Taiwan authorities openly
instigated and directly participated in the so-called ‘March 26 march’.
Are
these only empty words again?” the Xinhua news agency said.

The best explanation for the law, which is now looking like a rare
political
blunder on the part of the Beijing leadership, is that it seemed like a
good
idea in the middle of last year when it was first mooted.
Back then Mr Chen was making provocative noises and Chinese President
Hu
Jintao needed to consolidate his leadership to prove his hawkish
credentials
were a match for those of his lingering predecessor Jiang Zemin.

By the time the law, widely telegraphed in state media, had worked its
way
through the central Government’s ponderous and byzantine bureaucracy,
things
had changed.

Mr Chen had done poorly at legislative elections and therefore lost any
mandate to push further on independence. He had been forced to make a
political pact with his pro-Beijing adversaries in the People’s First
Party
and China and Taiwan had managed to agree on the first direct charter
flights between them since 1949.

In Beijing, Jiang Zemin had announced his complete retirement. But by
then
the loss of face in abandoning the hardline law on Taiwan was too
great.

Political common sense alone would dictate that it could have been
dusted
off the next time Mr Chen started getting up Washington’s nose by
pushing
his pro-independence line too far.

Posted at 7:40 AM · Comments (0)

What does the military-industrial complex do when it runs out of enemies? No problem, darling. It still has friends. And with friends like India and Pakistan, who needs enemies?

Military hardware is surely the most astonishingly brilliant con ever devised. You spend millions on creating a fabulous death machine, offer it to one side in the name of security/superiority, and then make it a must-buy for the other in the name of parity. Talk of a win-win situation. By the time you’ve created an F-16 it’s a no-brainer.

The only concern about the F-16s that the United States is finally delivering to Pakistan (they were sold Heaven knows how many years ago) is whether all these years of disuse have converted them into F-15s. However, Pakistan’s defence establishment will ensure that what it receives is in mint-shape. India’s parallel purchasing force must have already measured out what is needed for strategic compensation.

Money, of course, is no object. It rarely is for governments. It never is for governments spending on patriotism. Have you ever stopped to consider why governments on principle have no respect for money? Because a government is the only body, apart from the awkwardly named Non-Government Organisation, or NGO, which does not have to earn what it spends. A government simply orders us to pay a large percentage of what we have earned, legitimately, and gives that arbitrary order the force of law through the will of Parliament. Governments do not earn, they spend. And “patriotic spending” is the ultimate holy cow: he who challenges it does so at serious risk. Pakistan’s defence budget is passed as a one-line item. The one section that is never questioned in an Indian finance minister’s speech is any rise in defence spending. Bill Clinton was the only politician I can recall who actually took advantage of the peace dividend following the collapse of the Soviet empire, and cut the budgets of both the Pentagon and the CIA. But Clinton was an unusual man. With George Bush, life is back to normal. To be fair, 9/11 did not take place under Clinton’s watch, but Bush is a traditionalist of the military-industrial complex cadre who would have found ways and means to strengthen its profitability.

How useful are those F-16s going to be to Pakistan? Will they serve any practical purpose or will their death rate be the familiar story of fighter planes crashing out of the blue during routine runs taking yet another young pilot’s life? The attrition rate of Air Force officers is the highest of any service because new technology promises only to be newer, not necessarily safer.

True, the F-16s can carry nuclear weapons. And if George Bush has decided to go ahead with the delivery of these planes, then this means official American recognition of Pakistan, and by corollary, India, as acceptable and mature nuclear powers. This is the most welcome aspect of this arms deal. America cannot now revert to the non-proliferation regime. If it has sold some of its finest weapons-delivery means to nuclear powers then it cannot pretend that it still expects them to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Clinton put serious pressure on both countries to disband their nuclear arms, as Strobe Talbott’s excellent memoir on the subcontinent, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb, reveals. Clinton had bullied Narasimha Rao into inaction when Rao wanted to declare India’s nuclear status, and thought, mistakenly, that he could repeat his performance. (Choice morsel from Talbott’s book, always worth re-savouring: the Clinton White House learnt of Pokharan 2 from CNN rather than the CIA. The CIA therefore got all the three Bigs of the last 15 years wrong. It failed to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union. It failed to predict India’s bomb. And of course it got Iraq hopelessly wrong. Clinton must have cut the CIA budget with special glee.) Bush has ended that element of Clinton’s policy, for there is no endorsement better than arms sales.

Since one consequence of nuclear capability is the MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) syndrome, the presence of F-16s in both countries might, paradoxically, strengthen notions of security among the insecure, and contribute further to the search for peace. Peace has never been a problem for sensible people. One assumes that insensible opinion in Pakistan has now concluded that Kashmir cannot be solved by war, and insensible opinion in India has decided that Pakistan cannot be destroyed by military aggression. Hawks will always search for better claws, but is there any ceiling to an arms race? Just recently President Pervez Musharraf declared that Pakistan had crossed a vital threshold when it achieved more than minimum deterrence capability. Indian defence ministers have always been blunt about their ability to deliver maximum punishment on the enemy in case India becomes the victim of a first strike. So what has the policy become now? Maximum deterrence? Mid-level deterrence?

The truth may be simpler. There is a visceral attraction to new weapons systems which defence establishments might find impossible to resist. War is fought between enemies, but the puppeteers of war, the arms manufacturers have no enemies. They only have friends. Any and every customer is welcome in the arms bazaar. They have no ideology. Their faith is written with the ink on a chequebook. Their inspiration is fear, and their catechism is the spread of suspicion. The fear does not have to be real; imaginary will do, as long as it can be sustained in the imagination.

Morality does not enter this game. Morality is for nerds. As long as you have the wherewithal, weapons are available, whether it be a flying machine or flying mortar. During a conversation the other day, Inder Malhotra, one of the greats of Indian journalism, mentioned that the 16 months of ceasefire that had held between India and Pakistan must be the longest uninterrupted trouble-free period in memory. The one incident of exchange of mortar, he added, was by “non-state” sources. Was mortar of such calibre so freely available to “non-state sources”, I wondered. He laughed at my naiveté. Had I seen the news on television, he asked, the previous evening? All I had to do was see the weapons that had been seized from an Indian Rajdhani train to realise what was available on our subcontinent from “non-state” sources. Some arms manufacturer somewhere must be thanking God for creating Indians and Pakistanis of a particular variety.

A basic question must be addressed even if it cannot be adequately, or convincingly, answered: do India and Pakistan need any more hi-tech, exorbitantly priced weapons for each other? Aren’t the nuclear bombs and missiles sufficient?

It is obvious that President Bush treats Pakistan as a vital strategic partner of America in the world’s most volatile region, and wants to reward President Musharraf for the risks the latter has taken in pursuit of a joint strategy with Washington. But surely President Bush also appreciates that there are imponderables. Would Pakistan be as cooperative in its support of American military action as it was during the war against the Taliban, if the United States moved against Iran? Nor can Pakistan choose to be aloof, as it has been about the war in Iraq. Iran is a border state. There cannot be a clause in the sale contract insisting that the F-16s are permitted to fly in only one direction — towards India!

One presumes that the American decision is part of a larger scenario in which Pakistan is a pro-American fortress guarding the eastern walls of the Middle East region. This would in turn fit in well with the American desire to see peace between India and Pakistan, so that Pakistan stops being a hostage, in its mind, to the Indian threat. The problem with such formulations is that they are drawn on shifting sand, vulnerable to passing storms. It is possible that someone in Washington has calculated that both India and Pakistan need a weapons upgrade from the West; that India’s defence budget is too Russia-centric; and that the best way to force India to turn west for arms is to supply Pakistan with them. This seems possible if only because it sounds logical. But is it the logic of a think tank strategist or a defence contractor?

I only have the questions. I wish I had the answers.

Posted at 10:42 PM · Comments (1)

Anguished, beautiful and desperately alive, “Oldboy” is a dazzling work of pop-culture artistry.

March 25, 2005  |  Now that pop culture is virtually the only culture many of us live with from day to day, is it possible that, like human beings deprived of sunlight or vitamin C for too long, we’ve come to crave classic themes anywhere we can get them? I’m not just talking about people who warmed to Hardy, Melville, James and Euripedes in school and now lead workaday lives with little time to read, or those who would love to buy opera tickets regularly but can’t afford to. I’m talking about anyone who ever bothers to set foot in a movie theater, or even just turns on the TV. On television, “Buffy the Vampire Slayer” used young-adult school and dating problems as an excuse for trawling the wider territory of redemption, guilt and universal moral responsibility. And at the movies, “Kill Bill Vol. 2” (less so than “Vol. 1”), framed as a typical revenge story, was actually a complex meditation on the high price of maintaining dignity in the face of humiliation.

“Kill Bill Vol. 2” didn’t do well with audiences, and although “Buffy” had a fiercely passionate following, it wasn’t exactly a ratings buster. But the fact that these stories keep forcing their way into the culture at all, like stubborn crocuses refusing to buy into the mere concept of winter, suggests that we need more ways of interpreting the polychromatic strata of human emotion than “American Idol” and “America’s Next Top Model” can give us. Even the fact that comic books, many of them based on ancient dramatic tropes, keep getting made into movies (albeit often lame ones) tells us something is missing in our diet — something that books, music and theater gave earlier generations even before the invention of moving pictures.

Could this explain why more Westerners are finally paying attention to Asian filmmaking? While big-budget American pictures have sorely fallen down on the job of giving audiences the rich dramatic textures they yearn for, in the past few years Asian cinema has given us pictures like Zhang Yimou’s “Hero” and “House of Flying Daggers,” and even cop movies like Andrew Lau and Alan Mak’s “Infernal Affairs,” all of which found favor with savvy audiences. (Hollywood, apparently hoping to duplicate magic on a Xerox machine, is remaking “Infernal Affairs” with Matt Damon and Leonardo DiCaprio. The director is Martin Scorsese.)

Park Chanwook’s “Oldboy,” from Korea, is quite different from the above-mentioned pictures, not least because of the intensely graphic nature of its suggested violence. And perhaps even more than those pictures do, “Oldboy” makes us feel a part of something bigger than ourselves. It’s a grand, gritty, indelible experience, the sort of picture that mimics great literature in the way it envelops you in a well-told story while also evoking subtle but strong gradations of emotion.

“Oldboy” begins as a revenge fantasy and evolves into something much more complex and redemptive. It’s a thrilling picture, and in places a funny one, yet it can’t be classified as an action picture or a comedy — it’s too infused with tragic poetry to be so conveniently buttonholed. “Oldboy” is a viscerally charged picture, and an exceedingly beautiful one, but its beauty springs directly from its anguish. It’s like a flower watered with blood.

The hero and the victim of “Oldboy” is Oh Dae-su (Choi Min-sik), who is, when we first meet him, a gregarious but average Seoul businessman who’s gotten a little drunk after a night on the town. He’s arrested for his disorderly conduct, detained briefly, and released into the custody of a friend. That’s when his nightmare begins: Before he can return home to his wife and young daughter (it’s her birthday, and he’s bought her a pair of white-feather angel wings as a gift), he’s abducted mysteriously. Oh Dae-su doesn’t know who has kidnapped him, or why. But whatever he’s done, his tormentor has gone to inhumane lengths to make him suffer: He’s confined to a seedy hotel room, furnished with a TV set, a bed and a “Night Gallery”-style clown painting, and fed a diet of nothing but fried dumplings — for 15 years.

And then one day Oh Dae-su — toughened up from exercising regularly in his room, his knuckles permanently callused from using the wall as a sparring partner — is pitched back out into the real world, without ever having learned why he was confined for so long, or the identity of his captor. He has nowhere to go (during his imprisonment, he learns from watching TV that he has been framed for his wife’s murder). He has, however, been provided with a cellphone and a wallet full of cash. The phone rings, and he answers it: The mysterious voice on the other end challenges Oh Dae-su to find out what his crime was. This isn’t the beginning of Oh Dae-su’s freedom; it’s merely a new and more cruel type of confinement.

But on his first evening of what he at least perceives to be his freedom, he does meet a lovely young sushi chef named Mido (Gang Hye-jung), who spirits him away to the safety and comfort of her small flat after he passes out, from exhaustion and illness, in her restaurant. Mido is eager to help Dae-su put the pieces of his life together: She learns where his daughter is living (supposedly, in Sweden) and treks with him to every restaurant in the city in order to find the exact dumplings he was served during his confinement.

The closer Mido gets to Dae-su, the more she’s endangered — at one point at the hands of Dae-su himself, who believes Mido may have betrayed him. And as Dae-su learns more about the enemy who imprisoned him, he realizes that Mido is in even more danger than he is: As his nemesis tells him, coldly, “I’m going to kill every woman you love until your death.”

Explaining so few of the plot details of “Oldboy” makes it seem like your standard-issue clever thriller. But to explain any more would spoil the pleasure of the plot’s many surprises and intricacies. Some viewers might see “Oldboy” as little more than a puzzle movie, a mechanical novelty along the lines of the popular but stultifyingly shallow “Memento.” If that’s all some viewers get out of “Oldboy,” it’s their loss. This is Park’s fifth movie: His first hit in Korea was the 2000 thriller “JSA: Joint Security Area.” The 2002 “Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance” (which will be released here later this year) was a nicely structured but cold little picture about the futility of revenge. “Oldboy” is a deeper, warmer picture that delves into a similar theme. It’s also a story of potentially doomed romance. In some ways, “Oldboy” feels more Russian than Korean — it’s fitting that the movie’s coda takes place in a forest draped in fresh snow, a setting that speaks equally of desolation and fresh new beginnings.

The picture skates along so deftly, and through so many movements, that it feels like many pictures in one. Bits of “Oldboy” are downright funny, although many of the jokes are too bleak to be characterized even as black humor. The movie also features a number of beautifully staged action sequences, including one in which Dae-su fends off a half-dozen baddies in a long corridor with nothing more than a hammer. Park shows us the action in one unbroken shot, moving the camera along horizontally (and slowly) so we can take in the full spectacle of the actors’ movements — the sequence has the feel of a panoramic battle scene etched on a Greek vase. And the movie’s score, by Yeong-wook Jo, mixes Morricone-style melodrama with delicate Italianate strings — there’s room for it all in the picture’s shifting array of moods.

There are moments in “Oldboy” that some viewers have difficulty with, including an instance of self-mutilation and a sequence in which several teeth are pulled with the claw-end of a hammer. Park cuts away artfully, in both instances — what we don’t see disturbs us much more than what we actually do. These sequences may be graphic, or at least suggestively graphic, but they’re not overtly violent, and they don’t serve the purpose that violence so often does in movies: They’re not exhilarating or cathartic; if anything, they intensify the pathos of the story, even when (as in the tooth-pulling scene) they’re also darkly funny. Dae-su is a rather doughy, jolly fellow before his imprisonment, a happy-go-lucky but bland presence. He emerges from those 15 years as a much more complicated creature, but he’s also something of a monster. In the scenes of his long imprisonment, we hear him explain, in voice-over, all the roles television can fill for a lonely person: school, home, friend, lover. When he gets to the word “friend,” Boris Karloff’s Frankenstein flickers on the screen. Later, when Dae-su is freed, he stumbles toward the first human being he sees, extending a clumsy hand to touch the man’s face.

The moment is moving, but Park quickly flips it around to show us that Dae-su’s suffering hasn’t instilled any compassion in him (at least, not yet). “Oldboy” is a story of redemption, but it’s not an oversimplified one. As Choi plays him, Dae-su isn’t immediately sympathetic; in fact, it takes an astonishingly long time for us to feel anything for him. His face, framed by a thatch of bristly black hair, often wears a look of comic anguish, as if the distinguishing features of the comedy and tragedy masks had been mixed up. The bags under his eyes are a metaphor for the emotional weight he carries; he looks like a man who’s had the soul kicked out of him. But as the story progresses, he becomes more and more handsome: There’s something both virile and tender about him in his scenes with Mido. (Gang, with her softly rounded features and dreamy dark eyes, gives a beautifully shaded performance.) The changes we see in him are so transfixing that his ultimate humiliation, in the movie’s climax, is nearly impossible to bear.

But “Oldboy” isn’t depressing. Park gives us the release we need and deserve, in exchange for the trust we’ve placed in him. There are scenes that may seem gratuitous, or at least just gimmicky, as you’re watching them. But after the movie’s over, you see how carefully they fit into Park’s vision. When Dae-su first stumbles into Mido’s restaurant, after he’s just been sprung from captivity, he makes a request that she doesn’t quite understand. He repeats it: “I said, I want to eat something alive.” So she brings him an octopus, a moist, pearly-gray thing still moving on the plate. He bites the head off, and then shovels the tentacles into his mouth; they curl and clutch at his lips, as if making one last desperate grab at life.

The scene is both horrifying and a little funny, particularly when, immediately after having devoured this weird meal, Dae-su passes out on his plate. The meaning of the sequence is clear: After having been imprisoned for so long, Dae-su has no idea how to start living again. He seems to hope, irrationally, that he can jump-start the dead circuits inside him by eating something that’s still moving.

That logic is, of course, futile. But to people who keep trekking to the movies, hoping for a few hours of escape at least and transcendence at best, it probably makes a rueful kind of sense. So many pictures, even some very well-made ones, seem dead on arrival. But “Oldboy” is desperately alive, something Quentin Tarantino was clearly aware of when he tried to rally support for the picture among his fellow jury members at the 2004 Cannes Film Festival. And when something’s this alive, Hollywood smells money: An American remake of “Oldboy” is reportedly in the works.

But “Oldboy,” as delicate as a snowflake and as hardy as a thumbprint, will not be duplicated. It’s a dazzling work of pop-culture artistry, a product of its time, maybe, but not, strictly speaking, just a product. “Oldboy” sends us home with more than we came in with. We leave the theater knowing we’ve experienced something, instead of just feeling we’ve been bought — or, worse yet, had.

Posted at 7:20 PM · Comments (0)

Dakar/Brussels, 24 March 2005: Cynically exacerbating social tensions for political gain, Côte d’Ivoire’s leaders risk losing control and sparking a disastrous regional conflict.

Côte d’Ivoire: The Worst May Be Yet to Come,* the latest report by International Crisis Group, examines the on-again-off-again civil war that has divided the country since 2002. With both UN and French peacekeeping mandates expiring in April, the international community must act decisively to prevent an explosion of violence.

“With each cycle of violence in Côte d’Ivoire, the killing gets worse”, says Suliman Baldo, Director of Crisis Group’s Africa Program. “The next cycle might not only bring wide-spread ethnic cleansing in this country but also a regional war. Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso could easily be drawn in, and Liberia’s fragile peace could also fall apart”.

Côte d’Ivoire has seen worsening cycles of violence since 1999, when General Robert Guei seized power. Several coup attempts and open fighting, partly sponsored by ex-Liberian President Charles Taylor, led to continuous war in the western part of the country. Though peace talks in 2003 produced a government of national reconciliation, quarrels over criteria for presidential eligibility, land, formation of an independent electoral commission, disarmament, and security remain sources of severe unrest.

This highly polarised political situation means there is presently no prospect of independent and effectively supervised elections, and it may be necessarily to push back the timetable for the presidential and legislative elections, currently planned for October and December respectively, by several months. Taking charge of elections, as Prime Minister Seydou Diarra requested the UN to do, is more than an organisational task: those actors whose interest is not to have free and fair elections can be expected to actively block the process.

The UN Security Council should strengthen the efforts of the African Union (AU) mediator, South African President Thabo Mbeki, by publishing the report its commission of inquiry carried out. Targeted sanctions should be introduced against those who attempt to block the peace process. The AU, together with the UN, should organise the process to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate former soldiers; undertake voter registration; and establish a new calendar for the elections.

Since November 2004, when Ivorian forces killed French troops, and the French responded by destroying the Ivorian air force, the French peacekeeping presence has been controversial. Paris should negotiate with the UN over a possible gradual withdraw of its troops, but any departure of French peacekeepers should only happen once replacement troops under UN command are in place on the ground.

“The UN and AU have only two choices: apply strong pressures to compel the belligerent parties to do what they won’t do willingly, or disengage and let matters run their course”, says Mike McGovern, Crisis Group’s West Africa Project Director. “The most probable result in the second scenario would be a long, ugly war”.

Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) 32 (0) 485 555 946
Jennifer Leonard (Washington) 1 202 785 1601
To contact Crisis Group media please click here
*Read the full Crisis Group report on our website: http://www.crisisgroup.org

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, multinational organisation covering over 50 crisis-affected countries and territories across four continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Côte d’Ivoire: The Worst May Be Yet to Come

This report is currently only available in French.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The next seven months are a time of great danger for Côte d’Ivoire. Under pressure of an increasingly suspect 15 October 2004 election deadline, its political class may lose control of the cyclical violence it has orchestrated during the on-again, off-again civil war that has divided the country since September 2002. With both UN and French (Licorne) peacekeeping mandates expiring on 4 April, the international community must act decisively to renegotiate key aspects of its involvement to prevent an explosion. The African Union (AU) and its mediator, South African President Thabo Mbeki, should work to organise in close cooperation with the UN the implementation of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) program, voter registration and a new schedule for three polls — presidential and legislative elections preceded by a referendum on a key constitutional article determining who is eligible for the presidency. It is imperative that a clear agend a be set now to allow the international community to achieve its redefined objectives in Côte d’Ivoire within the next eighteen months.

While this may push back the electoral timetable — presidential elections are currently set for October, legislative elections for December — by a few months, it is necessary because the present situation is so polarised that no Ivorian electoral commission can be expected to operate independently and effectively. Taking charge of elections, as Prime Minister Seydou Diarra requested the UN do after his 3 March meeting with President Mbeki, is more than an organisational task; it is a political imperative. Those actors whose interest is not to have free and fair elections can be expected to actively block the process. The Security Council should strengthen President Mbeki by publishing immediately the report of its commission of inquiry (finished since October 2004) and making clear it is prepared to apply targeted sanctions to all who attempt to block the process, as indicated in Resolution 1572 (15 November 2004).

The international community faces a clear dilemma: it can either apply strong pressure to compel the belligerent parties to do what they will not do willingly, or disengage and let matters run their course. Since it does not appear either side is strong enough to win militarily, the most probable result in the second scenario would be a long, ugly war of attrition, accompanied by large-scale massacres. The pressures building as a result of the actions of the armed militias, the drumbeat of hate media, and the political extremism that characterise the Ivorian scene are such that a middle course between coercion and inaction is not viable.

The protagonists of the Ivorian crisis are adept at pretending to cooperate in what diplomats under the peace process framework. However, this has nearly always meant one step forward, two steps back. The explosion of violence that follows a period of relative calm has become more serious each time. Not many more cycles will be needed before the dynamic morphs into qualitatively worse violence, probably including large-scale ethnic cleansing. That would be a tragedy for more than Côte d’Ivoire: Guinea, Mali, and Burkina Faso would likely be drawn into a regional conflict. The greatest damage could be done to Liberia’s fragile peace process, which is meant to culminate in presidential and legislative elections just four days before Côte d’Ivoire’s scheduled presidential vote.

The composition of the international peacekeeping forces should also change, reflecting the events of November 2004, during which the Ivorian armed forces killed French troops and the French responded by destroying the Ivorian air force and killing between twenty and 57 civilians.[1] These events undermined the impartial stance of the French contingent. Without judging whether the Ivorian attack was intentional or the French response justified, the Licorne peacekeepers have become too vulnerable and controversial to be able to perform their work with the effectiveness required in the an explosive an environment as that prevailing in Côte d’Ivoire.

In order to give a peacekeeping mission that is accepted by all parties a chance to succeed, the French government should begin negotiations with the UN about a gradual drawdown of its contingent, and a parallel substantial strengthening of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). The new UN troop deployment must include a robust rapid reaction unit, well-equipped, with helicopters in particular, as UN Secretary General Kofi Annan requested on 9 December 2004. South Africa should play a crucial role in strengthening UNOCI, adding to its political commitment in the name of the African Union (AU), a strong military engagement. In the absence of this suggested recomposition of peacekeeping troops, it is imperative that the French government maintain its military presence in support of UNOCI.

In November 2004, a lid was placed on the bubbling violence because the UN, the AU, ECOWAS, France and the U.S. spoke with one voice. There is a grave risk that unless the international community acts in unison again to provide an alternative to the political uncertainty, Côte d’Ivoire’s conflict is bound to get much worse in 2005.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the African Union (AU):

1.  Organise, with the UN, and carry out over eighteen months:
(a) a referendum on changes to Article 35 of the constitution, determining the criteria for eligibility to run for the presidency;

(b) presidential elections;

(c) legislative elections; and

(d) a comprehensive DDR process, which includes the armed militias in the south.

2.  Request the UN Security Council strengthen President Mbeki’s mediation and request President Mbeki allow the application of targeted sanctions against those who constitute a threat to the peace and national reconciliation process in Côte d’Ivoire, as specified in Security Council Resolution 1572.

To the United Nations Security Council:

3.  Apply targeted sanctions, as specified in Resolution 1572.

4.  Pass a Resolution that:
(a) renews the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) with (i) more troops and a rapid reaction unit that can effectively replace departing Licorne troops; (ii) an expanded and strengthened mandate that focuses on organising and holding elections, and organising and undertaking DDR in collaboration with the AU; and (iii) a finite, eighteen-month timeframe;

(b) orders immediate publication of the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Allegations of Serious Violations of Human Rights and of International Humanitarian Law in Côte d’Ivoire; and

(c) instructs the Secretary General to (i) plan in cooperation with the French Ministry of Defence the gradual withdrawal of French Licorne troops and their simultaneous and imperative replacement by qualified UNOCI peacekeepers, including troops from South Africa and, possibly, troops from EU member states with rapid reaction units, engaged either on the basis of national decisions or as a result of common action in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy; (ii) transfer some equipment from UN Missions in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and Liberia (UNMIL) to UNOCI; and (iii) reinforce the Human Rights Division of UNOCI including by adding offices in Odienne, Korhogo, Bouna, and San Pedro.

To France:

5.  Remain engaged with and continue to contribute to the Ivorian peace process and the UN peacekeeping mission in the accomplishment of its new tasks.

6.  Do note begin withdrawing Licorne forces before they can be replaced by a credible, strengthened UN force with a rapid reaction unit.

To South Africa:

7.  Deepen its political commitment to the Ivorian peace process with a strong military contribution to UNOCI.

To the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI):

8.  Cease support for armed “patriotic” militias and use the Forces Armées Nationales de la Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) to stop all breaches of the ceasefire between those militias and the Forces Nouvelles.

9.  Support a referendum organised by the UN and the AU on changes to Article 35 of the constitution.

10.  Abide by results of the referendum and participate in presidential and legislative elections organised by the UN and AU.

11.  Disarm all armed “patriotic” militias, including the GPP, the FLGO, and the MILOCI.

To the Forces Nouvelles:

12.  Return to the Government of National Reconciliation.

13.  Support a referendum organised by the UN and the AU on changes to Article 35 of the constitution and abide by results of the referendum.

14.  Guarantee freedom of movement and access to all AU and UN staff working on elections and DDR.

To all other political parties in Côte d’Ivoire:

15.  Support a referendum on changes to Article 35 of the constitution, organised by the UN and the AU, and campaign for a “yes” vote with a view to encouraging reunification of Ivorian society.

16.  Participate to the different votes organised by the AU and the UN.

Dakar/Brussels, 24 March 2005

[1] Around twenty civilian victims according to French sources, 57 according to Ivorian officials.

Posted at 3:13 PM ·